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The Right to Cable Royalties and the Divisibility
of Copyright: Understanding the Interaction
The federal Copyright Act of 19761 creates a compulsory licensing system that requires cable operators to pay statutory
royalty fees for retransmission of copyrighted programs. The
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT) annually distributes these
cable royalties to copyright owners.2 The Copyright Act also
recognizes the infinite divisibility of a copyright - thus a copyrighted program may have more than one copyright owner.3
The possibility that a copyright might have mutiple owners
has resulted in disputes between program producers and program syndicators regarding entitlement to cable royalties.4 In
resolving the first such dispute, the D.C. Circuit affirmed a
CRT ruling that the syndicator is the proper distributee of
cable royalties. 5 The court, however, distinguished the distributee from the owner of the royalties, and held that the contract
between the producer and syndicator determines cable royalty
ownership. 6 In a subsequent producer-syndicator dispute, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the parties' syndication contract as
placing cable royalty ownership in the producer. 7 Because the
courts recognized only recently that copyright owners can contractually transfer cable royalties, the number of contract disputes between producers and syndicators is likely to increase.8
1. General Revision of Copyright Law Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).

2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d)(4), 801(b)(3) (1988).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
4. See 1984 Cable Royalty Distribution, 51 Fed. Reg. 8408, 8408 (1987)

[hereinafter 1984 Distribution] (final determination).
5. NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C. Cir.

1988).
6. Id.

7. Barris Indus. v. Worldvision Enters., 875 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir.

1989).
8. Disputes regarding cable royalty ownership may increase even more
rapidly if Congress adopts the Federal Communications Commission's recent
proposal to abolish the compulsory license system. See In re Compulsory
Copyright Licenses for Cable Retransmission, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 6711, 6711 (1989).
Because cable licensing royalties will increase under a free market system, see
id. at 6720, and the incentive for syndicators and producers to litigate their respective right to receive cable royalties should also increase.
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Accordingly, a framework for analyzing the parties' respective
rights to cable royalties is necessary. 9
This Note provides such a framework. Part I describes the
commercial and cable television industries, cable television's
impact on the syndication market, and the copyright protection
of commercial television. Part II discusses the courts' approach
to resolving cable royalty disputes between producers and syndicators. Part III argues that the D.C. Circuit correctly recognized that the syndication contract determines the copyright
owner. This Part, however, further analyzes why the D.C. Circuit's holding is the correct interpretation of the 1976 Copyright
Act, and demonstrates that the right to cable royalties is an
economic benefit attaching to subdivisions of the distribution
and performance rights. Part IV provides a framework for interpreting and drafting syndication contracts that ensures the
appropriate party receives the cable royalties. The Note concludes that both the statutory language of the Copyright Act
and economic considerations support an interpretation of the
compulsory license system that allows producers to transfer the
right to cable royalties to syndicators. Moreover, given the economic benefits of such a transfer, courts and practitioners
should promote the transfer of cable royalty ownership to
syndicators.
I.

THE CABLE CONTROVERSY

A. THE INDUSTRY
An understanding of cable television's dependence and im9. Numerous commentators have analyzed the compulsory license system, but prior to this Note no commentator has analyzed the right to cable
royalties. See Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the
Marketplace Model, 2 CoMm/ENT L.J. 477 (1980) (criticizing the compulsory license system and proposing a free market system of retransmission consent);
Meyer, The Feat of Houdini or How the New Act Disentanglesthe CATV-CopyrightKnot, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 545 (1977) (explaining the history and provisions of the compulsory license system); Note, Crossed Signals: Copyright
Liability for Resale Carriers of Television Broadcasts, 16 IND. L. REv. 611
(1983) [hereinafter Note, Crossed Signals] (analyzing whether resale carriers
who provide cable operators with distant broadcast signals should be subject to
copyright liability); Note, Cable Television's Compulsory License: An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed?,25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 925 (1980) [hereinafter Note,
Compulsory License] (analyzing the criticisms of the compulsory license system and arguing that adoption of a free market system would be premature);
Note, A New Method of Calculating Copyright Liability for Cable Rebroadcasting of Distant Television Signals, 94 YALE L.J. 1512 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Copyright Liability] (criticizing the compulsory license system as subsidizing cable operators and proposing a free market-like system).
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pact on the television industry is helpful before undertaking
analysis of the respective rights program producers and syndicators have in cable royalties.
1.

The Commercial Television Industry

The commercial television industry is founded on the distribution of programs to home television viewers.10 Broadcasters acquire programs, coordinate them into a full broadcast day,
and transmit them to home viewers 1 within reach of their
broadcast signal.' 2 Rather than charging home viewers to receive their broadcast signals, broadcasters sell "audience attention" to advertisers. 13 The projected size of the viewing
audience determines the value of the advertising time for a par14
ticular program.
Broadcasters receive programs contained in a broadcast day
from three main sources.15 One source of programming is net10. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 700 (1965). These
programs include feature films, series, specials, sports, and news, and may be
either live or prerecorded. NETwoRK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, AN ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION PROGRAM PRODUCTION, ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBurION 16 (June, 1980) [hereinafter NETwORK

INQUIRY] (preliminary report).
11. See 1978 Cable Royalty Distribution, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026, 63,032 (1980)
[hereinafter 1978 Distribution] (final determination) (citing '"Iemorandum
Submitted In Support of the National Association of Broadcasters' Position,"
at 19).
12. Cf Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 416 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "TV waves travel in straight lines, thus reaching a
limited area on the earth's curved surface"); Note, CompulsoryLicense, supra
note 9, at 927 (noting that terrain can block television reception).
13. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207, 232 (1982); Note, Crossed Signals, supra note
9, at 614.
14. See Note, Crossed Signals, supra note 9, at 614; Note, Compulsory License, supra note 9, at 928; Note, Copyright Liability, supra note 9, at 1516.
The projected audience size depends on numerous factors including the popularity of the program, the program's time slot, and the program's exclusivity.
See NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 379; Note, CrossedSignals, supra note
9, at 614. The competitive programming on other stations and the number of
viewers with access to the broadcast station's signal also affect audience size.
15. See NETwORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 13. In addition to the three
primary sources of programming, broadcast stations also may receive programming from other sources including the Public Broadcasting Service, devotional
organizations, and sports. See, e.g., 1986 Cable Royalty Distribution, 54 Fed.
Reg. 16,148, 16,149 (1989) [hereinafter 1986 Distribution] (final determination)
(listing claimant categories by programming source); see also Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 703 (1965) (listing some programming
sources).
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works. 16 Networks either produce their own programs or contract with independent program producers for the exclusive
right to exhibit their programs.' 7 Only broadcast stations affiliated with one of the three commercial networks 8 receive network programming.' 9 A second source of programming is
programs produced at the broadcast station.20 Both independent broadcasters 2 ' and network-affiliated broadcasters engage
in some in-house production. 22
This Note focuses on the third source of programming:.
syndicators. 23 Syndicators are either independent companies licensed by program producers to distribute their programs to
broadcast stations,24 or separate divisions of program produc16. Rules re Microwave, 38 F.C.C. at 703; NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note
10, at 13, 116-17; Note, Compulsory License, supra note 9, at 936.
17. Note, Compulsory License, supra note 9, at 936. Independent producers range from very small to huge major motion picture companies. NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 18. Independent producers generally license
networks to exhibit their programs for a limited time period with renewal
rights. Id. at 230-36.
18. American Broadcasting Company (ABC), National Broadcasting Company (NBC), and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS).
19. See e.g., Note, CompulsoryLicense, supra note 9, at 936. Because network affiliated broadcast stations are interconnected electronically, networks
can simultaneously transmit their programs to a national audience rather than
a distinct set of local audiences. See NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 13.
Accordingly, networks sell program advertising time on a national level rather
than a local level. Note, CopyrightLiability, supra note 9, at 1514 n.10. Each
affiliated broadcaster receives a percentage of the network advertising revenue
based on the size of its viewing audience. Note, Compulsory License, supra
note 9, at 936. Affiliated broadcasters also obtain revenue from local advertising. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
20. NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 13, 15. These programs usually
are limited to local news and public interest programs. Id. at 15.
21. Independent broadcasters are defined as broadcasters not affiliated
with a network. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (1988).
22. NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 15. In-house produced programs
reach only a local audience so broadcasters must depend on local advertisers
for revenue.
23. See NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 13. Syndicators supply both
first-run and off-network programming. Id. at 14. First-run programs are programs developed specifically for syndicator distribution. Id. Off-network programs are programs that originally were, but are no longer, exhibited on a
network. Id.
24. Id. In conventional syndication agreements, the syndicator acts as the
producer's agent in exchange for a percentage of the revenue generated
through the syndicato's licensing of broadcast stations. Id. Some syndication
agreements, however, involve an outright sale of the distribution right based
on a flat price for each program. See, e.g., 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at
8409 (discussing the outright sale of the "Little House on the Prairie" distribution right). Networks must syndicate their programs through an independent
company under an outright sale contract because of an FCC regulation that
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tion companies. 25 Independent syndicators often provide program financing to the producers. 26 A syndicator's primary
responsibility, however, is to solicit exhibition license agreements from broadcast stations and then supply the licensed stations with a tape of the syndicated programs.27 Syndicators
primarily distribute programming to independent broadcast
stations. 28
A syndicator's revenue depends on how many broadcast
stations she can license and how much each broadcast station
will pay for the right to exhibit her programs. 29 These factors
in turn depend on the potential revenue broadcast stations
could generate by selling advertising time on each syndicated
program.30 Because independent broadcast station signals
reach only a local audience,3 1 syndicated programs attract only

local advertisers. 3 2

prohibits networks from engaging in the syndication process. 47 C.F.I
§ 73.658(j)(i) (1988). This regulation provides that no television network shall
sell, license, or distribute television programs to television station
licensees within the United States for non-network television exhibition or otherwise engage in the business commonly known as "syndication" within the United States; ... or reserve any option or right to
share in revenues or profits in connection with such domestic ... sale,
license, or distribution.
Id.; see also NETrWORK INQuiRY, supra note 10, at 335-39 (analyzing the economic effect of this regulation).
25.

NETwoRK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 14.

26. See id. at 122-24, 128-30 (discussing the role of advance financing of

off-network and first-run programs by syndicators).
27. Id. at 14. Off-network programs also are supplied to the station on
tapes. In contrast to first-run programs, the station retains the tape for the
term of the license agreement or until the authorized runs are completed. Id.
28. Because independent broadcasters do not receive programming from
the networks, they must rely on syndicators to supply their programming.
HousE COMm. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, NETWORK BROADCASTING, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1958) [hereinafter
NETWORK BRoADCASTING]; NErwoRK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 116-18. Net-

work-affiliated broadcasters also receive some programming from syndicators
because the networks do not supply sufficient programming to fill an entire
broadcast day. NErwoRK BROADCASTING, supra, at 47.
29. See supra note 24.
30. See, e-g., Note, Crossed Signals, supra note 9, at 614. The more an advertiser will pay to advertise on the program, the more the broadcaster will
pay for the right to exhibit the program. Id. In contrast, if the program will
generate very little advertising revenue, the broadcaster may not enter an exhibition licensing agreement at all. To increase the attractiveness of syndicated programs to advertisers, broadcasters may contract for the exclusive
exhibition right in their local market. See, ag., Note, Compulsory License,
supra note 9, at 936.
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. See, ag., Note, Copyright Liability, supra note 9, at 1516 & n.22; see
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The Cable Television Industry 33

Cable companies receive the signals of broadcast stations
through antennae, by microwave, or by satellite, and simultaneously retransmit4 those signals without alteration- through a
network of cables to the viewing audience.3 Because television
viewers have free access to local independent and network programming, cable operators primarily retransmit the signals of
distant, independent broadcasters.3 7 Viewers compensate cable
operators for the increased diversity of programming by paying
3s
monthly subscription fees.
B. THE CABLE-COMMERCIAL TELEVISION CONTROVERSY AND
THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976

The birth and growth of cable competition economically injured the commercial television industry by drawing viewers
also Note, Crossed Signals,supra note 9, at 615 (noting that "advertisers in the
broadcaster's local market may not value [a] nationwide audience as potential
customers"). There are two exceptions to having only local advertising on independent broadcast stations. One exception is national "spot" advertising,
whereby national advertisers buy time in selected market areas because of a
concentrated sales effort, lack of a network affiliate in the market, or a desire
for more flexibility than a network provides. NETWORK BROADCASTING, supra
note 28, at 49. The second exception is independent "super stations" such as
WTBS, which are widely retransmitted by cable, and therefore are able to
market their programs to national advertisers. See Brotman, supra note 9, at
482.
33. Cable television commonly is referred to as CATV, an acronym for
community antenna television. Meyer, supra note 9, at 545 n.1. Early CATV
systems used master antennae to bring local broadcast signals into homes that
had difficulty receiving the conventional signal because of the terrain.
Brotman, supra note 9, at 478.
34. Simultaneous retransmission is required by law. 17 U.S.C. § 111(e)
(1988). However, "under special and limited exceptions, applicable only to offshore contiguous states, the taping of a program and the transmission of the
tape is considered a secondary transmission." Meyer, supra note 9, at 551 (discussing the effect of 17 U.S.C. § 11(e)-(f)).
35. Section 111(c)(3) prohibits cable operators from altering the signal
they receive. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3) (1988). Thus, cable operators cannot generate revenue through the sale of advertising time.
36. Meyer, supra note 9, at 545 n.1.
37. Note, Crossed Signals, supra note 9, at 613 n.18; Note, Copryight Liability, supra note 9, at 1514 n.10.
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (1988) (defining "cable system"); HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,

2d Sess. 88 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659,
5702-03 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; Rivkin, The Changing Signals of Cable

T.V., 60 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1480 (1972); Note, Crossed Signals, supra note 9, at 613
n.18.
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away from commercial television. 39 Accordingly, the television
industry sought government protection from cable competition.
The industry complained that cable operators intercepted
broadcast signals and retransmitted them to subscribers without paying royalties for the commercial use of the copyrighted
programs contained in the signals. 40 Before the 1976 Copyright
Act, however, the commercial television industry did not have
copyright protection from these unauthorized retransmissions.41 The industry's only recourse was to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which enacted extensive
regulations limiting the competitive threat of cable.42 With the
39. See, e.g., Note, Copyright Liability, supra note 9, at 1516.
40. See, e.g., Brotman, supra note 9, at 478; Meyer, supra note 9, at 546. In
contrast, commercial broadcast stations must pay copyright royalties. See
Brotman, supra note 9, at 478.
41. The broadcasters initially challenged cable retransmissions as unfair
competition. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 349 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965); see also Note, Compulsory License, supra note
9, at 929 (discussing the broadcasters' claim). The Ninth Circuit rejected this
claim, stating that "[s]ave for the limited protection accorded the creator of...
works ... anyone may freely... avail himself of such works... subject only
to the qualification that he does not steal good will, or, perhaps more accurately stated, deceive others in thinking the creations represent his own
work." Cable Vision, 335 F.2d at 351. The Ninth Circuit advised that any challenge to cable retransmission of copyrighted programs should be made either
by or in conjunction with the copyright owners under copyright law. Id. at
353.
The television industry, however, soon discovered that existing copyright
law did not protect them from unauthorized cable retransmission of copyrighted programs. In an infringement action brought under the Copyright Act
of 1909, copyright owners claimed that cable retransmission of copyrighted
programs constituted a public performance without authorization and therefore violated sections 1(c) and (d) of the Act. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 394-95 (1968). Section 1(c) granted copyright
owners the exclusive right to perform nondramatic literary works in public for
profit, and section 1(d) granted owners the exclusive right to perform dramatic
works publicly. Id. at 395. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that cable retransmission did not constitute a public performance. Id. at
400-01; see also Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1974) (affirming and expanding the Fortnightlyholding to provide that importation of
distant signals by cable companies into markets that otherwise could not be
reached by the broadcaster's signal is not a copyright infringement). Rather,
the Court in Fortnightly found that cable was a passive system that did no
more than enhance the television viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's
signal, which already had been released to the public at large. Fortnightly,392
U.S. at 399-400; see also Teleprompter,415 U.S. at 408 (adopting the Fortnightly
reasoning). The Court further stated that it took the Copyright Act of 1909 as
it found it. Fortnightly,392 U.S. at 401-02. A compromise decision to accommodate "the competing considerations of copyright, communications, and antitrust" was a job for Congress. Id. at 401.
42. Extensive FCC regulations, including a requirement that cable opera-
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1976 Copyright Act, however, Congress finally reached a statutory solution to the controversy between commercial and cable
43
television.
Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act sets out five exclusive rights accruing to a copyright owner, 4 These rights include an exclusive distribution right45 and an exclusive
performance right.4 As defined, "performance" includes the
retransmission of broadcast signals by cable operators to subscribers. 47 The exclusive rights allow the copyright owner to
exploit economically the copyrighted work.
The copyright owner's rights, however, are not absolute.
tors receive retransmission conLsent from the originating broadcast station, resulted in a virtual "freeze" on cable operation. Note, Compulsory License,
supra note 9, at 932-33. Because broadcasters viewed cable as competition,
they refused to sanction retransmission of their. signals by cable. Id. at 933.
These harsh FCC regulations forced cable operators into negotiations with the
commercial television players. Id. at 934. In the resulting compromise, Cable
Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) (commonly known as the
"Consensus Agreement"), cable operators agreed to support proposed copyright legislation requiring cable operators to pay copyright royalties. See Note,
Compulsory License, supra note 9, at 934. In exchange, the FCC agreed to allow limited growth of the cable industry. Id. The FCC, however, provided additional protection to the commercial television industry by limiting the
number of distant broadcast signals cable operators could import, id. at 934-35,
and by requiring cable operators to delete programs from signals imported into
major markets on the request of local broadcasters who had purchased exclusive rights to the programs. Id. at 935-36. This compromise was the catalyst to
finally reaching a workable statutory solution to the cable-copyright problem.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1988); see also Note, Compulsory License, supra note
9, at 937-40 (discussing the history of the 1976 Copyright Act). The 1976 Copyright Act represents a compromise between the commercial television industry
and cable operators. See id.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Section 106 provides that
[Tihe owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;,
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly;, and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.

Id.
45. Id. § 106(3).
46. Id. § 106(4).
47.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 63.
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Sections 107 through 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act impose various limitations and qualifications on the rights granted in Section 106.48 One of these, section 111, was the long-awaited
solution to the cable-copyright controversy: a compulsory licensing system. 49 Subject to specified statutory requirements,
section 111 gives each cable operator the right to retransmit all
broadcast signals allowed by FCC regulations.5° If a cable operator fails to comply with any statutory or regulatory requirements, its retransmission of broadcast signals constitutes a
copyright infringement. 51
In exchange for the right to retransmit the copyrighted
programs contained in broadcast signals, cable operators must
make prescribed royalty payments to the Register of Copyrights.5 2 The royalty payments are based on a percentage of the
gross receipts a cable operator receives from subscriptions to
the basic cable service of retransmitted broadcast signals.53 The
number of distant broadcast signals the cable operator retransmits determines the appropriate percentages 4 Accordingly,
cable royalties increase when cable companies increase either
their gross receipts or the number of distant signals they carry.
48. Id. at 61.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1988). Congress adopted a compulsory licensing system rather than an alternative solution because it feared that market negotiation for retransmission rights would result in a freeze on cable operation, as
previously had occurred, or would be prohibitively expensive. In re Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 6711, 6712

(1989).
50. 17 U.S.C. § Inl (1988); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 93.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(2)-(3) (1988). At the time the Act was passed, relevant FCC regulations included a limitation on importation of distant broadcasting signals and the syndicated exclusivity rule. See supra note 42. Both
regulations were later repealed. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff.sub nom. Malrite T.V. of New York v.
FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). The FCC,
however, reinstated the syndicated exclusivity rule. Cable Television Services:
Program Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,167
(1988).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1) (1988).
53. Id. § 111(d)(1)(B). As defined, "gross receipts" excludes revenues
from cable installation, movie channels, and all other non-basic services.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 96.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 11(d)(1)(B)(i)-(iv), (f) (1988). Only distant signals are relevant to royalty fee calculation because cable retransmission of local signals
does not'injure the copyright owner of programs contained in the signals. Local advertisers compensate the original broadcaster for the audience reached
by cable retransmission of programs into the original market. Local advertisers, however, will not pay for the audience reached by cable retransmission in

a distant market. See supra notes 14, 30-32 and accompanying text. Thus, statutory cable royalties need only compensate copyright owners for cable's use of
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C. THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY TRIBUNAL
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT) administers the
compulsory licensing system.5 5 The CRT is charged with two
functions. First, the CRT periodically reviews and, if necessary,
adjusts the statutory royalty fee rate.- The CRT also annually
57
distributes the cable royalties to copyright owner claimants.
their programs in distant markets. See Note, CopyrightLiability, supra note
9, at 1514 n.10.
In calculating the number of distant signals a cable operator retransmits,
the Copyright Act draws a distinction between retransmission of network-affiliated broadcasters' signals and independent broadcasters' signals. 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(f) (1988). Retransmission of an independent signal counts as one "distant signal equivalent" whereas retransmission of a network signal counts as
one-quarter of a "distant signal equivalent." Id. The reason for this distinction
is that the majority of an affiliated broadcaster's programming contains national advertising. Because national advertisers value the audience reached by
cable retransmission, the copyright owners of network programming are not
injured by cable retransmissions. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at
90; Meyer, supra note 9, at 559 n.63; Note, Compulsory License, supra note 9,
at 941; see also supra note 19 (discussing why network programs reach a national audience). The one-quarter "distant signal equivalent" represents the
approximate portion of each network affiliate broadcast day that contains locally transmitted syndicated programs. In contrast, independent broadcaster
signals primarily contain syndicated programming with local advertising that
does not benefit from cable retransmission. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d)(5), 801, 804 (1988); see also Meyer, supra note 9, at
565-69 (discussing the role of the CRT).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (1988). The CRT can adjust royalty rates to reflect
inflation, deflation, changes in the average rates charged cable subscribers, and
changes in FCC regulations. Id. § 801(b)(2); see also Meyer, supra note 9, at
565-68 (discussing the CRT's ability to adjust the royalty rates).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4) (1988). Because each individual'program retransmitted by cable has one or more copyright owners, the number of copyright
claimants coming before the CRT is potentially unlimited. See infra text accompanying notes 64-66 (discussing the divisibility of a copyright). To simplify
and facilitate the annual distribution, the CRT has established a two phase
process. E.g., 1978 Distribution, supra note 11, at 63,027.
In the first phase, the CRT divides the royalty fund on a percentage basis
among groups of copyright owner claimants. E.g., id. Each Phase I group consists of claimants representing a general source of retransmitted programs.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing program sources). For
example, one group, currently known as the "program suppliers," consists of
all the copyright owners of retransmitted syndicated programs. See, e.g., 1986
Distribution, supra note 15, at 16,149-50. The program supplier group consistently has received the majority of the cable royalty fees, averaging approximately 70% per year. See, e.g., 1979 Cable Royalty Distribution, 47 Fed. Reg.
9879, 9897 (1982) [hereinafter 1979 Distribution] (final determination).
Another group consists of all broadcasters claiming royalty entitlement
for retransmitted station-produced programs. See 1983 Cable Royalty Distribution, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,792, 13,811 (1986) [hereinafter 1983 Distribution] (final
determination). Today, this group is called "commercial television." Cf.1986
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If the claimants privately agree to the royalty allocations, the
Distribution, supra note 15, at 16,149 (noting that the commercial television
category consists of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)).
In 1978, there were six Phase I groups. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters
v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (NAB 1), cert
denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986). The six groups were program syndicators and
movie producers, sports leagues, television broadcasters, public television, music claimants, and radio claimants. Id. Today, there are nine Phase I groups.
See, e.g., 1986 Distribution, supra note 15, at 16,155. The nine groups are program suppliers, joint sports, commercial television, public broadcasting service,
music, devotional claimants, Canadian claimants, commercial radio, and National Public Radio. Id. The 1983 groups are virtually the same as the 1978
groups with only a name change. The three additional Phase I categories result from subdivisions of 1978 Phase I groups splitting off and forming their
own Phase I groups. For example, the devotional claimants initially were included in the program syndicators and movie producers group. See 1980 Cable
Royalty Distribution, 47 Fed. Reg. 24,768, 24,768 (1982) (notice). The Canadian
claimants, who represent the copyright owners of both Canadian television
and radio programs retransmitted by cable operators in the U.S., respectively,
were included in the 1978 television broadcasters and radio groups. NAB I, 675
F.2d at 372. Lastly, commercial radio and National Public Radio were included
in the 1978 radio group. Id. at 373. In each distribution year, at least one
Phase I group has not qualified for any cable royalties. E.g., 1983 Distribution,
supra, at 12,812 (noting that commercial radio has consistently failed to show
entitlement to a quantifiable award).
In Phase II of the distribution process, the CRT allocates the royalties
among the claimants within each of the Phase I groups. See, e.g., 1978 Distribution, supra note 11, at 63,027. For example, if the Phase I devotional claimants group received 5% of the royalty fund, in Phase H the CRT would divide
the 5% on a percentage basis between all the claimants within the devotional
claimants group. Once the allocations are completed, a particular devotional
claimant may have 25% of the 5% devotional claimants Phase I allocation or,
in other words, 1.25% of the total royalty fund. Phase H allocations are necessary only if a dispute arises between the claimants within a Phase I group.
See, e.g., id.
Claimants within a Phase I group may be individual copyright owners,
each with rights to one or more programs retransmitted by cable. For example, the devotional claimants Phase I group includes the Christian Broadcasting Network, PTL Television Network, and Old Time Gospel Hour, each
representing only their own interests. E.g., 1980 Cable Royalty Distribution, 48
Fed. Reg. 9,552, 9,561 (1983) [hereinafter 1980 Distribution] (final determination). On the other hand, Phase I groups may contain associations representing a group of individual copyright owners. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(A) (1988)
(allowing copyright claimants to "lump their claims together and file them
jointly or as a single claim, or ... designate a common agent to receive payment on their behalf"). Because most claimants exercise the right to bring
joint claims, Phase I groups usually consist of a limited number of associations.
For example, the major claimant in the syndicated program supplier group is
the Motion Picture Association of America. See, e.g., 1986 Distribution, supra
note 15, at 16,149. In the 1986 distribution proceedings, the MPAA represented 99 producers and syndicators claiming cable royalties for 6,299 different
syndicated series, movies, and specials. Id.
The commercial television Phase I group consists of only the National As-
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CRT simply distributes the funds according to their agreement. 8 If the parties cannot reach a settlement, the CRT conducts evidentiary hearings to determine the proper allocation of
the royalties.59 Claimants dissatisfied with the CRT's allocation
may appeal the CRT's decision to a federal appellate court. 6°
Given the large size of the cable royalty fund,61 it is not
surprising that the CRT has had to resolve numerous disputes
sociation of Broadcasters. See id. at 16,149. When a Phase I group consists of
only one claimant, the CRT need not make a Phase II allocation.
When an agency or association represents copyright owners before the
CRT, the copyright owners must privately negotiate further allocation of the
cable royalties. Further allocation by private negotiation follows from the fact
that the CRT has never faced a dispute between individual copyright owners
represented by the same association. See, e.g., 1985 Cable Royalty Distribution,
53 Fed. Reg. 7132, 7132 (1988) [hereinafter 1985 Distribution] (final determination). For example, the MPAA must determine how much of the cable royalties the copyright owner of Little House on the Prairie and the copyright
owner of Hogan's Heroes should each receive. This type of dispute should be
distinguished from a dispute over who is the relevant copyright owner of Little House on the Prairie, a dispute that did arise in the 1984 and 1985 distribution proceedings. See 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at 8408; 1985
Distribution, supra, at 7132; see also infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text
(discussing these disputes).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(A) (1988) (providing that "any claimants may
agree among themselves as to the proportionate division of compulsory licensing fees among them"). Claimants are free to settle at both the Phase I and
Phase II distribution levels. If the claimants settle as to only a portion of the
funds, the CRT has the discretion to distribute the portion of the funds not in
controversy while withholding an amount sufficient to satisfy all claims in
controversy. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(C) (1988).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(B) (1988). The primary factors guiding CRT royalty allocation are
(a) the harm caused to copyright owners by secondary transmissions of copyrighted works by cable systems,
(b) the benefit derived by cable systems from the secondary
transmission of certain copyrighted works, and
(c) the marketplace value of the works transmitted.
E.g., 1978 Distribution, supra note 11, at 63,035. The secondary factors are: 1)
the quality of copyrighted program material; and 2) the amount of cable retransmission time allocated to the programs. E.g., id. The CRT's goal is to
simulate market valuation of the retransmitted programs. Id. at 63,036. Evidence of market valuation introduced by the claimants includes the Nielsen
Study, which measures the number of hours of distant signal programming
viewed by cable households; attitudinal surveys, which measure the value
cable operators place on certain kinds of programming; and testimonials. E.g.,
1983 Distribution, supra note 57, at 12,803. The CRT consistently has given
most weight to the Nielsen Study introduced by the MPAA. Id.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 810 (1988).
61. Each year the size of the cable royalty fund has increased:
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over the proper allocation of cable royalties.6 2 In resolving
Year of Collection
1978
1979
1980

Size of Cable Fund
$ 17,717,000r
23,732,000
28,052,000

1981
35,559,000
1982
44,375,000
1983
84,317,00
1984
100,465,000
1985
113,264,000
1986
119,025,507c
1987
155,454,004
1988
91,810,554'
'Years 1978-85 represent total collections plus
accrued interest.
bYears 1984-88 include the basic, 3.75, and
syndicated exclusivity funds. The latter two
were created after a change in FCC regulations.
'Years 1986-88 represent only collections with
no accrued interest.
'Collections for first six month accounting
period only.
In re Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, 4 F.C.C. Rec.
6711, 6716 (1989).
62. The royalty claimants appealed one or more of the disputes arising in
the CRT hearing to a federal appellate court in the distribution years 1978,
1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1984. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 809 F.2d 172, 174, 176 (2d Cir.) (NAB II1), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1035 (1986). Since the first three annual CRT distributions, however, the
number of disputes have decreased. Claimants appealed six different disputes
in the 1978 and 1979 CRT distribution proceedings. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (NAB
1) (1978 appeal), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986); Christian Broadcasting Network v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 720 F.2d 1295, 1301-02 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(1979 appeal), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986). In contrast, only three disputes arose in the 1984 and 1985 CRT distribution proceedings. 1984 Distribution, suprm note 4, at 8408; 1985 Distribution, supra note 57, at 7132. In the
1986 distribution proceeding, there was only one dispute. 1986 Distribution,
supra note 15, at 16,149. Reduction of the number of disputes has occurred
primarily at the Phase I level. In 1981, 1984, 1985, and 1986, the claimants settled on the Phase I allocations. 1983 Distribution, supra note 57, at 12,792
(1981 settlement); 1986 Distribution, supra note 15, at 16,149 (1984-86 settlements).
One reason for this decrease is that the CRT adopted a policy of incorporating prior years' records into the distribution proceedings and changing prior
years' allocation percentages only upon a showing of changed circumstances or
that the previous allocation was faulty. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 772 F.2d 922, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (NAB Ii), cert
denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986); 1983 Distribution, supra note 57, at 12,792. The
second reason the number of disputes decreased is the standard of appellate
review mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
On review, federal courts will uphold the CRT's allocations unless they are arbitrary or capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence. E.g., NAB I,
675 F.2d at 371. Beginning with the appeal of the CRT's second royalty distri-
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these disputes, the CRT also has had to decide preliminary issues. One such issue is determining which claimant, when
more than one is seeking cable royalties for
the same retrans63
mitted program, is entitled to the royalties.
bution, the appellate courts have been adamant about the deference given to
the CRT's findings. See ChristianBroadcasting,720 F.2d at 1319 (stating that
"in many respects, we find challenges to the Tribunal's 1979 Decision to reflect
little more than the boundless litigiousness of disappointed claimants"); NAB
II, 772 F.2d at 940 (stating that "[w]e will not hesitate henceforth, should this
tack of litigation-to-the-hilt continue to characterize the aftermath of CRT distribution decisions, to refrain from elaborately responding to the myriad of
claims and contentions advanced by a highly litigious copyright-owner subculture"); NAB III, 809 F.2d at 183 (citing NAB II, 772 F.2d at 940). Due to these
two factors, most claimants probably recognize that re-litigating their differences is futile.
Some claimants, however, have persisted in challenging the CRT's distribution. For example, in every year but 1978 and 1981, Multimedia has sought
to increase its allocation of the Phase I program suppliers award at the expense of the MPAA. See 1986 Distribution, supra note 15, at 16,149.
63. See 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at 8408; 1985 Distribution, supra
note 57, at 7132. Additional disputes that may arise in the distribution process
include 1) whether a cable system retransmitted the copyrighted program; 2)
whether the claimant's copyrighted material is compensable; and 3) whether
the retransmitted program is in the public domain.
Because of the minimal filing requirements necessary for cable royalty entitlement (claimants need only identify a single cable retransmission of the
program), 37 C.F.R. § 302.7(b)(4) (1989), the first type of dispute has arisen
only once. In the 1979 distribution proceeding, Multimedia, the National Association of Broadcasters, and others, challenged a number of claims made by
the MPAA as not meeting the CRT's filing requirements. 1979 Distribution,
supra note 57, at 9895. The CRT ruled that the evidence of program retransmission introduced by the MPAA was sufficient. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the CRT's decision. ChristianBroadcasting,720 F.2d at 1313.
The second type of dispute, which has arisen twice, focuses on the definition of "work" as contained in § 111(d)(4) of the 1976 Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(d)(3) (1988). This section requires the CRT to distribute cable royalties
to copyright owners whose work was included in a secondary transmission. Id.
The CRT and reviewing courts have interpreted "work" to mean programs
and the music contained in those programs. See, e.g., 1978 Distribution, supra
note 11, at 63,037, 63,040. The CRT has found that "work" does not include the
individual components of a program, id. at 63,033 (denying the copyright owners of cartoon characters compensation for the retransmission of their characters), or the "broadcast day as a compilation." Id. at 63,038. The CRT
distinguished cartoon characters from the music in programs on the basis of
contractual relationships and legislative intent. Id. at 63,033-34.
The third type of dispute, whether a claimant's program has entered the
public domain, also has arisen twice. NAB II, 772 F.2d at 936; ChristianBroadcasting, 720 F.2d at 1313. In each challenge, numerous copyright owners
claimed that some of the programs for which the MPAA was seeking cable
royalties had entered the public domain. The D.C. Circuit rejected the first
challenge because sufficient evidence existed to find that the royalties went to
bona fide copyright owners. ChristianBroadcasting,720 F.2d at 1313. In the
second challenge, the D.C. Circuit upheld the CRT's finding that although the
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The statutory catalyst for disputes regarding entitlement to
a program's cable royalties is section 201(d) of the 1976 Copyright Act.64 Section 201(d) provides that:
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law ....
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including
any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be
transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The
owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of
that right, to all of the protection
and remedies accorded to the copy65
right owner by this title.

This provision enables a copyright owner to transfer one or
more of the five exclusive rights, a subdivision of one or more
of the exclusive rights, or any combination of the two. A program thus may have more than one copyright owner, each owning different rights in the copyright. The entitlement problem
arises because Congress directed the CRT to distribute cable
royalties to "copyright owners who claim that their works were
66
the subject of secondary transmissions by cable systems."
Congress gave no further direction.
Whether the current compulsory license system is maintained or a free market system is adopted, 67 multiple copyright
programs brought to their attention were actually in the public domain, these
programs were "such a small percentage of the total programming claimed by
MPAA as to be de minimis." NAB I, 772 F.2d at 936. Accordingly, the
MPAA's royalty allocation was not affected. Id. The court, however, expressed concern that the CRT's procedures did not provide a basis for challenging copyright ownership in a particular program. Id. at 936-37.
Specifically, the court found that claimants have no way of knowing what programs are being claimed by opposing copyright owners. Id. at 937. Rather, the
CRT requires a claimant to list only one program retransmitted by cable to
which the claimant owns the copyright. Id. The court urged the CRT to establish "a sensible way in which a good-faith examination of and challenge to
copyright ownership" could be made. Id.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1988).
65. Id.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(3) (1988).
67. Although the CRT has accomplished some degree of administrative efficiency and has attempted to simulate a free market in both the rate adjustment and distribution process, In re Compulsory Copyright License for Cable
Retransmission, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 6711, 6717 (1989), commentators frequently have
criticized the compulsory licensing system for not functioning as a free market. Id. at 6712; Note, Compulsory License, supra note 9, at 945-47. The basis
for this criticism is that copyright owners are unable to determine and respond
to actual public demand for their programs because the compulsory license
fees do not accurately reflect the market rate for programs. In re Compulsory
Copyright License, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 6712. In August, 1989, the FCC recommended abolishing the compulsory licensing system and adopting a system of
full copyright liability for cable retransmission without the copyright owner's
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owners will continue to disagree about their respective rights to
a program's cable royalties. 68 To date, such disputes have
arisen between three different sets of litigants: 1) sports teams
and broadcasters;6 9 2) broadcasters and program suppliers;70
permission. Id. at 6711. If Congress adopts this proposal, the CRT will no
longer allocate cable royalties. Other disputes the CRT has faced, however,
may arise before federal and state courts. See disputes discussed supra note 63
and accompanying text.
68. If Congress maintains the compulsory license system, disputes will
arise regarding who is entitled to statutory cable royalties. If Congress adopts
a free market system, disputes will arise about who is entitled to license cable
retransmission and thereby rezeive cable licensing revenue. See infra notes
129-31.
69. The dispute between sports teams and broadcasters involved the right
to cable royalties for retransmitted sports programs. E.g., National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 377-78 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (NAB 1), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986). The broadcasters based their
claim to royalties on two theories: 1) by producing and recording the sporting
events, they are either the sole or co-owner of the original copyrights; or 2)
although sports teams may be the original copyright owners of the sporting
events, by granting broadcast stations the exclusive exhibition rights, the
teams contractually transfer the right to cable royalties to the broadcast stations. Id. I will discuss each of these theories separately and then will discuss
their interaction.
The broadcasters' first theory of recovery consistently has been unsuccessful. In the 1978 distribution proceeding, the CRT denied the broadcasters any
original ownership right in the sports programs. 1978 Distribution, supra note
11, at 63,039. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit overturned the CRT's finding, holding that "Congress clearly seemed to contemplate Tribunal recognition of the
copyrightable interests claimed by [the broadcasters]." NAB I, 675 F.2d at 378.
The court, however, found that the copyright interest of the broadcasters was
quantitatively de minimis. Id. at 379. Accordingly, the court upheld the CRT's
total distribution to the commercial broadcasters of 3.25% of the royalty fund.
Id. This amount included allocations for the broadcasters' station produced
programming, but did not include any allocation for the retransmission of
sports programs. 1978 Distribution, supra note 11, at 63,038-39. In subsequent
distributions, the CRT has continued to find that the broadcasters original
copyright contribution to sports programs is minimal. 1980 Distribution, supra
note 57, at 9565.
As to the broadcasters' second theory of recovery, the CRT has recognized
that a sports team may contractually transfer its right to cable royaltiep to a
broadcaster. E.g., 1978 Distribution, supra note 11, at 63,039. In the 1979 CRT
distribution proceeding, the CRT stated that "cable royalties for sports programming shall be awarded to the sports claimants except when contractual
arrangements specifically provide that such royalties should be distributed to
broadcaster claimants." 1979 Distribution, supra note 57, at 9893.
On remand of the 1979 distribution dispute, the CRT accepted a joint proposal from the broadcasters and sports interests that the entire Phase I distribution of cable royalties for sports telecasts will go to the sports claimants and
"[a]ny subsequent sharing of royalties between these sports interests and
broadcasters will be left to their private resolution." 1979 Cable Royalty Distribution, 49 Fed. Reg. 3899, 3899 (1984) (remanded issues). This proposal
blurred the distinction between a claim based on original copyright ownership
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and 3) program producers and syndicators. Because of the comand a claim based on the contractual transfer of the right to cable royalties,
because both claims were merged into the private allocation process. The
broadcasters soon became dissatisfied with this private allocation procedure.
In the 1980 CRT distribution proceeding, the broadcasters again went before
the CRT asking for a valuation of their original copyright interest in the sports
programming. 1980 Distribution, supra note 57, at 9556. The reason for the
broadcasters' request was that the CRT's findings as to the value of the broadcasters' original copyright interest had a direct effect on the broadcasters' bargaining power with the sports teams. Id. As stated above, the CRT found this
original interest to be minimal. Id. at 9565. Thus, the broadcasters possess little bargaining power.
70. The first dispute between broadcasters and program suppliers, including both syndicators and producers, arose in the 1978 CRT distribution proceeding. See 1978 Distribution, supra note 11, at 63,032. The broadcasters
argued that because they held exclusive exhibition licenses, they were entitled
to all of the rights, remedies, and protection provided by the 1976 Copyright
Act, including the right to receive compulsory royalty fees. Id. The CRT rejected this argument holding that distribution of cable royalties to broadcasters would violate the congressional intent to compensate broadcasters only for
locally produced programs. Id. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the CRT's
refusal to compensate broadcasters as exclusive licensees. NAB I, 675 F.2d at
379 n.21. The court, however, did not base its ruling on congressional intent.
Rather, the court denied the broadcasters' claim because they had an alternative means of protecting their exclusivity rights. Id. The broadcasters could
force cable operators to delete certain syndicated programming from distant
signals under the FCC's exclusivity rules. Id.
Following this holding, the broadcasters did not renew their claim to cable
royalty entitlement until the 1983 distribution proceedings. 1983 Distribution,
supra note 57, at 12,806. The reason for renewing their claim in this proceeding was that the FCC had repealed the syndicated exclusivity regulations. Id.
at 12,814. The broadcasters argued that because they were bound by long-term
exclusive contracts and were not reimbursed for the loss of their exclusive exhibition right by the program suppliers, they bore the full cost of the repeal of
the exclusivity rules. Id. The CRT rejected this argument. Id. The first basis
for rejection was that broadcasters cannot possess exclusive rights against a
compulsory license and thus were not copyright owners within the meaning of
§ 201. Id. This interpretation may be an impairment of contract in violation of
the United States Constitution because it renders the exclusivity term of the
broadcasters' contracts void.
The second basis for rejecting the broadcasters' claim *as that the broadcasters had been on notice that the syndicated exclusivity rules were subject to
change at any time. Thus, they could have made appropriate adjustments in
their contracts. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the CRT's first basis for denying the broadcasters claim. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 809 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir.) (NAB III), cert denied, 475
U.S. 1035 (1986). The court, however, adopted the CRT's second theory and
denied the broadcasters any royalty fees for loss of their exclusive exhibition
rights. Id. at 181.
The Second Circuit's basis for denying relief is extremely questionable.
Although the court's basis for denying relief was that the broadcasters could
have adjusted their contracts to provide for the risk of regulatory change, id.
at 181, no reference was ever made to the actual contracts between the broadcasters and the program suppliers. See id. The Second Circuit also did not
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plexity of each of these disputes, this Note focuses only on the
disputes between program producers and syndicators. On a
general level, however, this Note's analysis pertains to all disputes between multiple copyright owners of a program.
II.

THE PRODUCER AND SYNDICATOR DISPUTES

Courts recently have addressed two disputes between a
program producer and a syndicator regarding entitlement to
the cable royalties for a retransmitted program. 71 The first proprovide that, if the broadcasters had not adjusted their contracts for the risk of
regulatory change, they individually could seek enforcement of their contractual rights in state court. See id. The reason for the Second Circuit's holding,
however, becomes more clear by reference to another statement it made. The
Second Circuit stated that if it were writing on a "clean slate" it would deny
the broadcasters' claim "on the ground that elimination of syndicated exclusivity rights increased the demand for and exposure of syndicated programs, thus
justifying increased royalties paid by the cable operators to the syndicators in
the form of the syndex fund." NAB III, 809 F.2d at 180; see also infra note 109
(discussing the syndex fund). The broadcasters did not deserve royalties from
the syndex fund because they were both "owners" and "infringers." NAB III,
809 F.2d at 179-80. Although a broadcaster is subject to competition from distant signals retransmitted into its own local area, it also may have its own signal retransmitted by cable into distant areas. Id. at 180.
The court's analysis is erroneous. First, although the court correctly recognized that cable retransmits a broadcaster's signal into distant markets, this
fact does not make the broadcaster an infringer. The broadcaster receives no
economic benefit from this retransmission. Secondly, the court erred when it
stated that elimination of syndication exclusivity rules increased the exposure
of programs to the detriment of the program suppliers. When a cable operator
retransmits a program into a market where a broadcaster had contracted for
the exclusive exhibition right of the program, the total number of program
viewers in that market does not increase. Rather, the same number of viewers
will be split between the broadcaster and cable operator. Because the broadcaster purchased the right to exhibit the program to the total number of viewers, the broadcaster, and not the program supplier, is injured by the repeal of
the syndicated exclusivity rules. Copyright owners are injured only when
broadcasters adjust their contracts to reflect their lower number of viewers.
When a contract gives the broadcaster the exclusive exhibition right, this adjustment clearly has not occurred. Therefore, only by analyzing the relevant
contracts can the court determine which party is entitled to the cable royalties.
71. 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at 8,408, modified, NBC v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (first dispute); Barris Indus. v.
Worldvision Enters., 875 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1989) (second dispute). Unlike the
disputes between broadcasters and sports teams, and broadcasters and program suppliers, each of these two disputes arose over the right to cable royalties for an individual program rather than over the relative rights of each
group in all programs. Barris, 875 F.2d at 1447; NBC, 848 F.2d 1290-91. This
difference likely exists because program producers and syndicators are represented jointly by the MPAA in the distribution proceedings. Therefore, distribution of royalties between the two groups is done on a program by program
basis outside of the CRT proceedings. See supra note 57.
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ducer-syndicator dispute, NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 2
arose in the 1984 CRT distribution process.7 3 Each party argued on both contractual and statutory grounds that it was entitled to the cable royalties. 74 The CRT resolved the dispute in
favor of the syndicator.1 5 In doing so, the CRT stated that the
syndicator was "the party to whom the Tribunal has in the past
and will consistently in the future distribute Section 111 royalties." 76 The CRT, however, expressly provided that "[t]his rul72. 848 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
73. This dispute was between NBC, the producer of "Little House on the
Prairie," and Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., the syndicator, who had contracted
with NBC to distribute off-network re-runs of "Little House." NBC, 848 F.2d
at 1289. The contract between these parties transferred to Worldvision the
"full and exclusive domestic distribution and profit participation rights... to
the 'Little House on the Prairie' television series." 1984 Distribution, supra
note 4, at 8409. These rights, however, were expressly limited to conventional
free television distribution. Id.
74. Worldvision argued that it was entitled to the cable royalties because
the royalties were profits derived from distribution to conventional free television and thus were within the contract terms. 1984 Distribution, supra note 4,
at 8410. Worldvision contended that but for its distribution to conventional
television there would be no initial transmission by broadcasters, no cable retransmission, and no cable royalties. Id. Moreover, Worldvision argued that
FCC regulations prohibited NBC from engaging in the conduct necessary to
give rise to cable royalties. Id.
Worldvision also argued that, because syndicators bear the risk of profit or
loss in program distribution, compensating syndicators is consistent with the
congressional intent to compensate copyright owners for cable's adverse impact on the marketability of their programs. Id.
Opposing Worldvision's contentions, NBC argued that the congressional
intent of § 111 was to compensate the program creators for cable operators'
use of their programs. Although NBC recognized that the copyright interest
entitling the owner to cable royalties may be transferred, NBC argued that, in
this case, there was no transfer. NBC contended that the compulsory license
system is a government substitute for the right to license performance by
cable systems. Because NBC granted Worldvision only the right to distribute
the program to conventional television systems, Worldvision could not have acquired the right to license cable systems. Worldvision was not entitled to the
cable royalties. Alternatively, NBC argued that the right to cable royalties attaches to the "performance" right and that it had only transferred the "distribution" right to Worldvision. Id.
75. 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at 8411.
76. Id. In support of this "syndicator distribution" rule, the CRT stated
that syndicators were the one party in the distribution chain most directly injured by cable retransmission of copyrighted programs, and that Congress intended to compensate those injured by cable retransmission. The CRT also
found that because syndicators assumed the risk of successful exploitation of
programs in the syndication market, equity entitled them to the cable royalties. The CRT also expressly rejected NBC's argument that Worldvision did
not possess the performance right. The CRT stated that Worldvision must
own the performance right because Worldvision authorized the broadcast stations to perform "Little House." Id.
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ing does not foreclose the syndicator from remitting the cable
copyright royalties up or down the chain of production and distribution pursuant to private contractual arrangement. ' 77 The
CRT further stated that the CRT is not the proper forum for
the resolution of contract disputes. 78
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the CRT's distribution
of royalties to the syndicator, but distinguished the distributee
of cable royalties from the owner of cable royalties. 79 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit found that the CRT's syndicator distribution rule could exist for administrative convenience,80 but that
courts must look to the parties' contract to determine the "relevant owner."8 1 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit never resolved
the question of cable royalty ownership.8 2
In the second dispute between a producer and a syndicator,
8 3 the Ninth CirBarris Industries v. Worldvision Enterprises,
cuit adopted the D.C. Circuit's holding that the parties' contract
determines cable royalty ownership.8 4 The Barris court then
examined the syndication contract to determine cable royalty
entitlementas The relevant contract language gave the syndicator the exclusive right to license the program for "television."s8 "Television" was defined to exclude cable systems.8 7
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
80. Id. at 1296 n.6. The court deferred to the distribution rule as not contrary to § 111 nor its legislative history, which was silent on the issue. Id. at
1296.
81. Id. at 1295. The court referred the contract dispute to the state courts.
Id.; see also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting
that disputes over the contractual transfer of copyrights are matters for state
courts), cert denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
82. See NBC, 848 F.2d at 1296 (stating that "[tihis disposition leaves the
parties free to litigate their contractual claims in an appropriate forum"). The
contractual right of Worldvision and NBC to the cable royalties was never litigated. Presumably, the parties settled.
83. 875 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1989). This dispute was between Barris Industries, the producer of the "Newlywed Game" and Worldvision Enterprises,
Inc., the syndicator of the program. Id. at 1447. The dispute was brought as a
diversity action before a federal district court rather than before the CRT. Id.
Use of this forum was consistent with the D.C. Circuit's holding that entitlement to cable royalties is a contractual question not properly resolved by the
CRT. Under the terms of the contract, California law governed the contract's
interpretation. Id. at 1450.
84. I& at 1449.
85. Id. at 1449-51.
86. Id. at 1447. The St. Louis, New York, and Los Angeles markets were
excluded by contract. Id.
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The syndicator's compensation was to be thirty percent of the
fees the producer "actually received" from the syndicator's licensing of television stations during the term of the contract.88
The syndicator claimed that this language evidenced the parties' intent to split the cable royalties between them. 9
The Ninth Circuit held that the contract provision prohibiting the syndicator from distributing the program to cable did
not preclude a finding that the syndicator was entitled to a portion of the cable royalties.9 The court, however, concluded
that the compensation provision unambiguously entitled the
producer to all cable royalties generated by the program. 9 1
In both producer-syndicator disputes, the courts held that
the contract between the producer and the syndicator determines the owner of the relevant copyright. 92 This holding implicitly recognizes that the original copyright owners - the
producers - initially own the right to receive cable royalties
and that they may transfer this right to the syndicators by contract. The courts rejected arguments that Congress intended
for either the producer or the syndicator to always receive the
royalties. 93 The next Part argues that the D.C. Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit correctly held that producers may contractually
transfer the right to cable royalties to syndicators and, in addition, provides the analysis necessary to understand the courts'
rationale.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1449.
Id. at 1451.

91. Id. The court refused to consider extrinsic evidence introduced by
Worldvision regarding the parties' intent because, under the test required by
California law, the contract was not "reasonably susceptible" to Worldvision's
proposed interpretation. Id. at 1450.
92. Id. at 1449; NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1293
(D.C. Cir. 1988). The D.C. Circuit stated that "ownership is itself dependent

on the contractual terms; it cannot be settled without reference to those
terms." Id. at 1294. This holding is distinguishable from the Second Circuit's
holding in the dispute between broadcasters and program suppliers. See supra
note 70. Although the Second Circuit recognized that program suppliers could
transfer the right to cable royalties, they assumed without looking at their

contracts that none had been made. Id.
In contrast, the CRT's holding in the sports teams-broadcasters dispute
that the sports claimants should receive the cable royalties except "when contractual arrangements specifically provide that such royalties should be distributed to broadcaster claimants" is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's holding.
See supra note 69 (discussing the sports teams-broadcasters dispute).

93. Barris Indus. v. Worldvision Enters., 875 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir.
1989); NEC, 848 F.2d at 1296.
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III. THE RIGHT TO CABLE ROYALTIES:
TRANSFERABILITY V. MANDATORY
OWNERSHIP
In NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, the D.C. Circuit
stated that honoring private contracts ensures that the party
harmed by cable retransmissions receives the royalties and upholds the section 201(d) goals of alienability and divisibility of
copyright.9 The D.C. Circuit, however, never explained why
the syndication contract determines the party harmed by cable
retransmissions. Moreover, the court failed to demonstrate
why the statutory transfer of ownership provision - section
201(d) - applies to cable royalties. Further analysis of the
court's rationale is thus necessary.
A.

COMPENSATING THE HARMED

PARTY

Congress enacted section 111 to compensate the parties
harmed by cable retransmissions of copyrighted programs. 95
The following analysis of cable television's impact on the syndication market9 demonstrates that, although contractual arrangements initially determine the party injured by cable
competition, the syndicator ultimately can pass all harm on to
the program producer.
Instinctively, one might argue that program producers are
harmed because cable retransmission exploits their programs in
a new market without compensation. 97 Rather than increasing
the total number of television viewers, however, cable competition primarily draws viewers away from commercial broadcast94. NBC, 848 F.2d at 1293.
95. See HousE REPORT, supra note 38, at 90; see also NTBC, 848 F.2d at 1293
(stating that "Congress intended that the cable royalties ultimately go to that
party who was directly harmed by the retransmission - that is, the owner of
the relevant copyright, who would otherwise be uncompensated for the exploitation of his or her property").
96. The discussion of the economic impact of cable television competition
is limited to the market for syndicated programming for two reasons: 1) this
Note focuses on the allocation of cable royalties between program producers
and syndicators; and 2) the economic impact of cable on network programming
is minimal. See supra note 54. This analysis also focuses only on independent
syndicators because, when the syndicator and the producer are the same party,
a dispute over cable royalties will not arise.
97. This was the misconception of the Second Circuit in a dispute between
broadcasters and syndicators over cable royalties, catalyzed by the FCC's repeal of the syndicated exclusivity rule. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 809 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 1986); see aso supra
note 70 (discussing the court's analysis).
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ers.9 8 As a result, broadcasters lose advertising revenue.9
Broadcasters, however, can pass on this decrease in revenue to
syndicators when the parties negotiate new contracts10° The
extent that cable importation of programs saturates a given
market determines whether syndicators receive a lower program licensing fee or no program licensing fee in that market.10 ' This decrease in broadcast licensing revenue harms a
syndicator in two circumstances.
98. See Note, Copyright Liability, supra note 9, at 1516 (noting that independent broadcasters compete with cable stations and that when cable
duplicates a program on the local independent station, fewer viewers watch
the independent station).
99. Note, CopyrightLiability, supra note 9, at 1516; Note, Crossed Signals,
supra note 9, at 616. Theoretically, a broadcaster's new distant viewers offset
the local loss of viewers. Independent broadcasters, however, cannot recoup
the loss of advertising revenue in their local market because local advertisers
place no value on the new distant audiences. See Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television Carriage, 57 F.C.C.2d 625, 640 (1976); see also Note,
Compulsory License, supranote 9, at 939 (noting that broadcasters do not consider distant audiences marketable to local advertisers); Note, Copyright Liaility, supra note 9, at 1516 & n.22 (noting that the "advertising on
independent television stations is locally targeted and thus has no value in a
distant market").
Initially, broadcasters were injured by the decrease in advertising revenue
because the price they had paid for exhibition rights was based on a higher
level of advertising revenue. See Note, Copyright Liability, supra note 9, at
1516. This phenomenon was especially prevalent when broadcasters contracted and paid for the exclusive exhibition rights of a program in their market only to have this right rendered worthless by cable importation of the
identical program. Because broadcasters are unable to pass the decrease in advertising revenue on to the syndicators until their existing contracts expire,
broadcasters should be entitled to some interim compensation. Unfortunately,
no compensation has been forthcoming. For a discussion of this problem in
the specific context of the syndicated exclusivity rule see supra note 70.
100. Cf. Note, Copyright Liability, supra note 9, at 1516 (noting that
"[i]ndependent stations thus lose advertising revenue and correspondingly pay
less for syndicated programming").
101. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 9, at 546; Note, CopyrightLiability, supra
note 9, at 1516. Contra Note, Crossed Signals, supra note 9, at 615 (arguing
that when a broadcaster's signal is retransmitted by cable, the copyright owner
charges the broadcaster a fee based on a nationwide audience). Cable retransmission of programs hurts the marketability of a syndicator's programs in two
ways. First, cable retransmission of any program into a given market creates
viewer competition for a syndicator's programs in that market. Thus, the potential viewing audience for the syndicator's programs is reduced and, correspondingly, the revenue the syndicator can earn from licensing programs also
decreases. Cable retransmission of the syndicator's programs also hurts the
syndicator. When a cable operator picks up the syndicator's program from one
market and retransmits it into a distant market, broadcasters in the receiving
market probably lose interest in the program. Thus, the syndicator receives
reduced licensing revenue.
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The decrease in syndicator revenue caused by cable retransmissions harm a syndicator when, at the time of contracting, it expects to receive cable royalties as compensation for
the existing decrease in program marketability and, therefore,
pays the producer for this right. 02 Such an expectation not
only is feasible, but also is reasonable. A syndicator may expect
to receive cable royalties because royalties would not exist but
for the initial transmission of the program by broadcast stations.'0 3 The cable royalties thus are a direct result of the syndicator's licensing of broadcast stations.'04 Another reason for
syndicators to expect royalties is that the CRT has consistently
distributed cable royalties to syndicators in the past. 10 5 Consequently, if the syndicator compensated the producer for the
right to receive cable royalties, the syndicator must actually receive the cable royalties to prevent harm.
Even if the syndicator did not pay the producer for the
right to cable royalties, a decrease in broadcast licensing revenues harms a syndicator when it occurs after the contract was
formed. Broadcast licensing revenues decrease if the regulatory structure changes in favor of cable operators.'06 When reg102. In essence, the syndicator recognizes that because of cable competition, broadcast licensing revenues will be lower than the pre-cable level.
Rather than adjusting downward the price paid for the distribution right, however, the syndicator believes that cable royalties will make up the difference
and thus agrees to the old price level. In contrast, if the syndicator does not
expect to receive any of the cable royalties, the syndicator will adjust the price
paid for the distribution right to reflect the decrease in broadcast licensing
revenue. When the syndicator acquires the distribution right through an outright sale, the syndicator simply will pay less for the right. When the syndicator receives a fixed percentage of the revenues generated through broadcast
licensing, the syndicator will demand an upward adjustment in the percentage
to compensate for the loss of revenues with no corresponding decrease in costs.
The syndicator still must market to, negotiate with, and physically distribute
the program to the independent broadcast stations. The only arguable decrease in costs would come from lower distribution costs resulting from lower
sales. The increase in marketing costs necessary to make sales in a less
favorable market, however, probably would offset any such decrease.
103. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing how cable
operates).
104. See NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (noting that the syndicator made this argument).
105. See 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at 8411; see also 1978 Distribution,
supra note 11, at 63,032 (stating that "Congress intended for royalties to be distributed to program syndicators and not to local stations").
106. Numerous regulatory changes have occurred since the compulsory license system was adopted. In 1977, the courts struck down the FCC's "antisiphoning" rules, which had placed stringent limits on the ability of cable systems to acquire programming. In re Compulsory License for Cable Retransmission, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 6711, 6718 (1989). In 1981, the FCC eliminated both its
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ulatory changes allow cable operators to become more
competitive, broadcasters lose viewers. The resulting decrease
in broadcaster advertising revenue subsequently reduces the
amount broadcasters will pay syndicators for program exhibition rights. 10 7 At the same time, cable royalties increase. 10 8 If
the syndicator does not receive this increase in cable royaltiesO to offset the decrease in its licensing revenues, the syndicator is harmed because it paid for a level of broadcast
licensing revenue that it no longer receives. ° Moreover, this
harm is aggravated because most syndication agreements are
long-term."'
Recognizing that cable retransmissions may harm syndicators under existing contracts does not warrant making syndicators the mandatory owners of cable royalties. Once existing
distant signal and syndicated exclusivity rules. Id. In 1985, the courts struck
down the FCC's "must carry" rules, which required cable operators to carry
local signals. Id. In 1988, the FCC reimposed the syndicated exclusivity rules.
Id. All but the last regulatory change were favorable to cable operators.
107. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. For example, if cable
operators are allowed to retransmit more distant signals, cable operators can
offer more diverse programming thus diverting viewers away from conventional broadcast stations. See Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143 (2d Cir.

1981).
108.
falrite T.V., 652 F.2d at 1143. Cable royalties increase when FCC restrictions are repealed because the CRT adjusts the statutory royalty rate to
reflect FCC deregulations, 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2)(B),(C) (1988), and because
deregulated cable companies are able to generate more gross revenue upon
which the cable royalties are based. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying
text. Other factors also affect the actual growth of cable and broadcast revenues. A regulatory change that does not result in an actual decrease in broadcast licensing revenues, however, may still create a relative decrease.
109. Theoretically, the producer could receive the level of cable royalties
existing prior to the regulatory change and the syndicator could receive only
the subsequent increase in cable royalties. This distribution is feasible because
the level of cable royalties existing at the time of contracting and the subsequent increase in the level of cable royalties resulting from regulatory change
are divisible. In fact, the CRT has established a system whereby increases in
cable revenues resulting from regulatory changes are distributed through separate funds. See 1983 Distribution, supra note 57, at 12,807-08. These funds
are known as the syndex fund and the 3.75% fund. Id. at 12,807. This system
would facilitate distribution of the increase in cable royalties to the syndicators when they are not entitled to the royalties from the standard fund. The
increase in cable royalties resulting from an increase in cable revenues, however, is not fully reflected in these special funds.
-10. See 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at 8411 (noting that "whatever
harm that might result [to] the successful exploitation of [the program] in the
off-network syndication market due to cable distant signal importation became
entirely [the syndicator's] to bear").

111. The duration of most syndication agreements is between 10 and 20
years. NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 121.
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distribution contracts expire, syndicators can adjust their new
contracts to avoid all harm. If syndicators know, at the time of
contracting, that they will not receive cable royalties, they will
not pay producers for this right."1 Rather, the decreased level
of broadcast licensing revenues alone will determine the price
paid for the distribution right. Additionally, to mitigate the
harm caused by a post-contract regulatory change favorable to
cable, syndicators can discount the price paid for the distribution right to reflect this risk.113 In effect, the producer pays the
syndicator to assume the risk of regulatory change.
In summary, the D.C. Circuit correctly recognized that
courts must honor current contractual arrangements to ensure
that the party harmed receives the cable royalties. 114 In subsequent contracts, however, broadcasters and syndicators can pass
all harm resulting from cable competition to the producer.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit's "compensating the party harmed" rationale does not justify a prospective rule that recognizes syndicator ownership of the cable royalties. As demonstrated
below, however, other reasons exist for recognizing syndicator
ownership of cable royalties.
B.

SECTION

201(d) DivisirY

AND ALIENABILITY

The D.C. Circuit also found support for its holding in section 201(d) of the 1976 Copyright Act. Section 201(d) provides
that a copyright is infinitely divisible and that its owner may
transfer any division of the copyright. 115 The D.C. Circuit
found that "[t]he goals of alienability and divisibility of copyrights would.., be subverted if private contracts were not enforced properly."' " 6 The court, however, failed to explain why
the right to cable royalties falls within the scope of section
201(d). Rather, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the CRT's expertise to fill the statutory gap left by Congress. 11 7 The CRT, how112. See supra note 102.

113. Cy Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 83, 84 (1977) (noting that
"tjhe fact that people are willing to pay to avoid risk shows that risk is a
cost").
114. See NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
115. See supra text accompanying note 65.
116. NBC, 848 F.2d at 1293.
117. Id. at 1296. The conclusion that Congress never considered the impact
of divisibility on cable royalty ownership is likely correct. For many programs,
the producer and the syndicator are the same party. Furthermore, prior to the
1976 Copyright Act, the divisibility of a copyright was not recognized. See
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ever, has not addressed the interaction of section 201(d) and
cable royalty ownership." 8 The following sections demonstrate
that section 201(d) should extend to cable royalty ownership.
1. The Statutory Language
To fall within the statutory language of section 201(d)(2),
the right to cable royalties must be either an exclusive right or
a subdivision of one or more of the five enumerated rights specified in section 106.119 Although the "right to cable royalties" is
not one of the exclusive rights enumerated in section 106,1 °
one can argue that the section 106 list is illustrative not exhaustive. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act implies
that there are additional exclusive rights.' 21
The right to cable royalties, however, is not comparable to
traditional exclusive rights. All five of the enumerated exclusive rights focus on the copyright owner's conduct. 2 2 Furthermore, these rights accrue when the copyright owner receives
the copyright.m The right to cable royalties, in contrast, does
not focus on the copyright owner's conduct. Rather, the right
to cable royalties requires that the CRT give the cable royalties
to the copyright owner.2 4 Moreover, this right does not accrue
to the copyright owner upon receiving a copyright. Before any
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 123. Thus, no history of conflict existed to

arouse legislative concern. Cf. Note, Trials of the TribunaL Toward a Fair
Distribution of Jukebox Royalties, 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 757, 778 & n.239 (1986)
(discussing Congress's failure to distinguish between music writers and music
publishers and the problems this oversight created in the distribution of jukebox royalties).
118. When establishing its syndicator distribution rule, the CRT did state
that the syndicator is typically the party injured by cable retransmission. 1984
Distribution, supra note 4, at 8411. The CRT, however, failed to justify this
rule in terms of § 201(d). Moreover, now that this rule is in place and courts
are resolving contractual disputes that arise, e.g., NBC, 848 F.2d at 1296-97, the
CRT likely will never address the interaction of § 201(d) and statutory cable
royalties.
119. See supranote 65 and accompanying text (quoting statutory language).
120. See supra note 44 for the list of exclusive rights included in 17 U.S.C.

§ 106 (1988).
121. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 123 (stating that "any of the exclusive rights that go to make up a copyright, including those enumerated in
section 106... can be transferred and owned separately" (emphasis added)).
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). For example, copyright owners have sole
discretion whether or not to reproduce their copyrighted works. Thus, if a
copyright owner decides to reproduce her work, she can do so without relying
on the prior conduct of anyone else.
123. See id For example, a copyright owner can reproduce her work
immediately.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4) (1988).
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right to cable royalties can arise, a cable operator must retransmit the copyrighted work. 5 The right to cable royalties thus
does not appear to be a new exclusive right. This conclusion is
consistent with the Congressional statement that the section
111 compulsory license system is a limitation on the enumer25
ated exclusive rights.
If not a new exclusive right, the right to cable royalties
somehow must attach to one or more of the five enumerated
rights. 12 7 How and to which enumerated rights the royalties attach is determined by analyzing the compulsory license system.
Congress adopted the compulsory license system as a substitute
25 In a free
for a free market system of full copyright liability.m
market, cable operators would have to negotiate with copyright
owners for the right to "perform" copyrighted programs. 2 9 Accordingly, the party entitled to license cable operators to "perform" copyrighted programs also would be entitled to cable
royalties.' 30 The right to license cable operators to perform
copyrighted programs is not a new exclusive right; it is a subdivision of the distribution right 13 1 and a subdivision of the performance right.132 The licensor, by necessity, must have both
125. A copyright owner cannot collect cable royalties upon receipt of her
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (1988).
126. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
127. See NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1294 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (stating that "the right to cable royalties [is] one of the incidents of ownership"). Recognizing that the right to cable royalties is an incident of ownership, however, does not answer the question as to which exclusive right the
royalties attach. This determination must be made because the owner's ability
to transfer the individual rights separately. See supra text accompanying note
114; see also NBC, 848 F.2d at 1293 (stating that "determining that a party owns
a copyright may be insufficient, for, as here, there may be more than one party
able to claim the benefits of a copyright for portions of the property in question"); infra note 132 (discussing the separability of exclusive rights in the
cable context).
128. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 89. One reason Congress chose the
compulsory license system was because it believed that the transaction costs
incurred in the bargaining between copyright owners and cable operators
would be prohibitively expensive. Id.
129. Id.
130. This right must be defined in terms of "licensing" because the right to
distribute copyrighted programs to cable operators is not divisible from the
right to distribute to independent broadcasters. See infra note 133.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988). Section 106 provides, in part, that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to "distribute copies ... of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending." Id.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988). Because a cable licensor would not perform
the copyrighted program, but rather would license others to do so, the licensor's "performance" right is dormant.
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these rights. 13 Granting licensees the right to perform the
copyrighted program publicly without making the program
physically available to them would be valueless. Alternatively,
providing licensees with physical access to the copyrighted program without also granting them the right to perform the program publicly would be valueless.
Although in a compulsory license system the actual licensing of cable operators is not necessary, the right to cable royalties remains an economic benefit resulting from ownership of
the appropriate subdivision of the distribution right and performance right. 13 Section 201(d) allows copyright owners to
transfer any subdivision of the distribution right and performance right.135 Thus, copyright owners may transfer the subdivision of the copyright to which cable royalties attach.
2.

The Economic Benefits
In addition to falling within the statutory language of sec-

133. Congress expressly recognized that the "exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called 'bundle of rights' that is a copyright, are cumulative and
may overlap in some cases." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 61. The right to
license performance of programs must be distinguished from physical distribution of the programs. Physical distribution to independent broadcasters and
cable operators are indistinguishable. In fact, syndicators cannot distribute to
independent broadcasters without also distributing to cable operators. Physical access to programs, however, does not give cable operators the right to retransmit them. Rather, cable operators must be licensed. Therefore,
syndicators' distribution of programs to cable companies without also transferring a performance right does not give cable companies the right to retransmit
the programs.
Cable royalty claimants previously have argued that ownership of the distribution right or performance right entitled them to the cable royalties. For
example, in a dispute between broadcasters and program suppliers, the broadcasters claimed that the cable royalties attached to the exclusive exhibition
right. 1983 Distribution, supra note 57, at 12,806-07. The exhibition right is
the equivalent of the performance right. Likewise, in the first dispute between a producer and a syndicator, the producer argued that the performance
right included the right to cable royalties. 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at
8410. In this same dispute, the syndicator argued that the right to cable royalties attached to the exclusive right to distribute the program. Id. The claimants, however, failed to recognize that subdivisions of both the distribution
right and performance right are necessary. Furthermore, the claimants failed
to recognize that because each exclusive right is divisible, the "stick" they
owned may not be the appropriate subdivision.
At one time, the producer actually argued that the right to cable royalties
was a substitute for the right to license cable operators. Id. The problem with
this argument was not its accuracy, but that it does not support the proposition
that the producer is, therefore, entitled to the cable royalties.
134. See supra note 44.
135. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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tion 201(d), the purpose underlying section 201(d) applies to the
right to cable royalties because economic benefits accrue when
the producer transfers this right to the syndicator. As discussed above,' the amount of broadcast licensing revenue is in136
versely related to the amount of cable royalties.
Consequently, when syndicators receive both broadcast licensing revenue and cable royalties, any decrease in broadcast licensing revenue resulting from regulatory change is offset by a
corresponding increase in cable royalties.'37 Likewise, any decrease in cable royalties is offset by an increase in broadcast licensing revenue. In effect, the syndicator has diversified away
the risk of regulatory change. 13
The producer also receives numerous benefits from transferring the right to cable royalties to the syndicator. First, the
producer receives full value for the distribution right because
the syndicator no longer will discount the price paid for the distribution right to reflect the risk of regulatory change. 13 9 In addition, the neutralization of regulatory change may encourage
syndicators to provide more advance financing of programs and
may even increase the number of syndication agreements. 140
The producer also benefits because the transfer of cable
royalties removes the syndicator's incentive to not market programs to broadcast stations whose signals are retransmitted by
cable. When a cable company retransmits a program to a distant market, the syndicator loses broadcast licensing revenue
from that program in the receiving market. 14 1 When the syndicator receives the royalty for the cable retransmission, however, retransmission does not injure the syndicator. Thus, the
syndicator will market programs to broadcast stations whose
signals are retransmitted by cable.
Furthermore, transferring the right to cable royalties to
the syndicator also shields the producer from the risk of a
downward fluctuation in cable royalties resulting from a regu136. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.

137. Id.
138. Cf. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note

113, at 85 (noting that diversifying risk eliminates or minimizes the risk by pooling it with other uncertain
events).

139.
140.
141.
cators

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
See Brotman, supra note 9, at 481-82. As a result of this injury, syndirefuse to sell their programs to broadcast stations retransmitted by

cable. For example, a Chicago station could not purchase the right to broadcast the NCAA basketball playoff games because the station's signal was

picked up by satellite and distributed nationwide to cable systems. Id.
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latory change unfavorable to cable. 14 Although in today's deregulatory climate this risk is probably minimal, a resurgence
of independent broadcaster protectionism may occur. Because
most syndication contracts are long term, 43 producers cannot
ignore the risk of regulatory change unfavorable to cable.
Eliminating the risk of fluctuation in broadcast licensing
revenues benefits bath the syndicator and the producer because
it facilitates their agreement on the price of the distribution
right. The producer and syndicator need only examine the potential revenue the program can generate in the market as a
whole.'" Moreover, the parties need not calculate a discount
for the threat of regulatory change. 14 5 As a result, the negotiation process becomes more efficient and transaction costs are
decreased.
In summary, the right to cable royalties attaches to subdivisions of the distribution right and the performance right, both
falling within the statutory language of section 201(d). 146 Furthermore, numerous economic benefits result from the transferability of cable royalties. 147 Thus, the D.C. Circuit correctly
concluded that the producer can transfer the right to cable
royalties.
IV. THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO CABLE
ROYALTIES
Recognizing that the right to cable royalties is an economic
142. Cf. suprm notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
of a regulatory change favorable to cable). Like the risk to the syndicator
when the syndicator only receives broadcast licensing revenue, when the producer only receives cable royalties, the producer is unable to offset a decrease
in cable royalties caused by an unfavorable regulatory change.
143. See supra note 111.
144. The parties need not try to predict what percentage of viewers will
watch the program on commercial television and what percentage will watch
the program on cable.
145. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 65 (quoting statutory language).
147. Courts could ensure these economic benefits by adopting a rule that
mandatorily places the cable royalties with the syndicator. The parties could
adjust their contracts for such a rule. The parties also may benefit by streamlining contract negotiations. A mandatory rule, however, has negative effects
that outweigh these benefits. Adopting a mandatory rule ignores contractual
relations entered prior to the rule's adoption and is unfair to producers who
contractually retained the right to cable royalties. See text accompanying
notes 112-13. Furthermore, a mandatory rule destroys flexibility. In certain
situations, the parties may prefer to assume the risk associated with a separation of broadcast licensing revenues and cable royalties.
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benefit attaching to a subdivision of a program's copyright, and
that a producer may transfer this right, provides a starting
point for determining who should receive cable royalties. How
courts and practitioners, respectively, should interpret and
draft contracts to ensure that the correct party receives the
cable royalties, remains an open question.
A. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CONTRACS
If all contracts between producers and syndicators expressly stated who should receive the cable royalties, courts
would have an easy time determining cable royalty ownership.148 Unfortunately, syndication contracts often do not specify the cable royalty owner. Producers and syndicators enter
into long-term relational contracts in which profits frequently
are shared. 149 Because of the ongoing interaction between the
two parties, they are less likely to articulate fully every issue
that may arise during the contract's life.lsa Failure to provide
for cable royalty ownership is especially likely under a compulsory license system because neither party has to engage physically in the licensing of cable operators. Furthermore, until
1988, courts did not recognize that the right to cable royalties
was capable of specific contractual transfer and did not
mandatorily belong to either the producer or the syndicator. 151
Simply because the syndication contract fails to provide
specifically for the transfer of cable royalties, however, does not
mean that this right remains with the producer. 5 2 As demonstrated above, the right to cable royalties attaches to subdivi1 53
sions of the distribution right and the performance right.

Every contract between a producer and a syndicator involves
148. For example, if the contract expressly states that the syndicator is entitled to cable royalties, one safely can assume that the syndicator paid for this
right. The producer certainly would not give the syndicator this right for free.
149. See supra notes 24, 111.
150. See MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 NW. U.L.
REV. 854, 903 (1978); Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impractibility,69 MINN. L. REv. 471, 487 n.50 (1985).
151. See NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C. Cir.
1988). Although, in the future, syndicators and producers contractually may
provide for the right to cable royalties, this does not help with the allocation of
cable royalties between producers and syndicators under existing contracts.
152. Cf. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir.)
(stating that "[i]f the words are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems
fairer that the burden of framing and negotiating an exception should fall on
the grantor"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
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the transfer of some portion of the exclusive distribution right
and the exclusive performance right. Syndicators, by necessity,
must receive both these rights or they physically could not provide broadcasters with programs or license broadcasters to perform programs.' 54 Possession of these rights, however, does not
automatically give syndicators the right to license both broadcasters and cable operators. Because both the performance and
distribution right can be infinitely subdivided,15 it is possible
for the producer to transfer only the portion of these rights
necessary for the syndicator to license broadcasters, and not the
portion of these rights to which the cable royalties attach.-5
Courts must decide whether the distribution right and performance right transferred to the syndicator includes the right
to cable royalties. As the first step in resolving contract disputes over cable royalty ownership, courts should look for evidence that the syndicator expected to receive all or a portion of
the cable royalties, and therefore paid the producer for this
right L5 7 As recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Barris,:' a
strong indicator of the syndicator's expectations to cable royal154. Although syndicators are considered the program distributors, their
duties consist of licensing broadcast stations to perform the copyrighted program. Thus, they also must have a "dormant" performance right. See 1984
Distribution, supra note 4, at 8411; see also supra note 132 and accompanying
text (discussing a cable licensor's dormant performance right).
155. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 61.
156. See NBC, 848 F.2d at 1295 (denying syndicator with exclusive distribution license a per se right to cable royalties); National Ass'n of Broadcasters v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 809 F.2d 172, 181 (2d Cir.) (NAB III), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1035 (1986) (denying broadcasters with exclusive exhibition licenses
any right to cable royalties). In practice, the right to license cable operators
would be very difficult to separate from the right to license broadcasters. Because syndicators and independent broadcasters are hurt by cable competition,
these parties would have an interest in making the cable licensing process difficult. By withholding information about which programs the independent
broadcasters intend to transmit, the syndicators and broadcasters may prevent
the cable operators from acquiring the necessary licenses. Cf. Glist, Cable
Copyright. The Role of the Copyright 0Ice, 35 EMORY L.J. 635, 638 (1986)
(noting that, in a free market, a single program supplier could frustrate cable
carriage of a broadcaster's signal by withholding the necessary license). This
problem is compounded because each program included in a broadcast day
may have a different licensor. Id. This problem, however, can be resolved by
a blanket license system, a system of licensing after the retransmission, or
simply by monitoring the independent broadcaster's promotional activity.
Although inefficient, someone other than the syndicator conceivably could license cable operators. Thus, recognizing that the right to cable royalties is a
separate division of the copyright bundle is valid. See supra notes 119-35 and
accompanying text.
157. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
158. Barris Indus. v. Worldvision Enters., 875 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1989).
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ties is how broadly the contract states the basis for the syndicator's compensation. 5 9 If the compensation clause is broad,
giving the syndicator all or a portion of the revenues resulting
from the licensing of broadcast stations, the syndicator probably expects to receive a corresponding portion of the cable revenue. The syndicator forms this expectation because cable
royalties are a direct result of her distributing the programs to
broadcast stations. 60 Moreover, limiting the syndicator's licensing right to broadcast stations will not negate this expectation because licensing of cable operators is not necessary to
generate cable royalties.' 6 ' Rather, under a compulsory license
system, cable operators only need access to the programs.
On the other hand, the compensation clause may be narrow, specifically limiting the syndicator's compensation to a
portion of the actual broadcast licensing fees. 62 Because such a
provision refers only to revenue received from broadcast stations with whom the syndicator negotiated actual agreements,
the syndicator probably does not expect to receive cable royalties

63

and will not compensate the producer for this right.

Unfortunately, the compensation provision is not disposi159. See id at 1451.
160. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. If a free market rather
than a compulsory license system exists, however, providing the cable operators with physical access to the programs will not give the cable operators the
right to retransmit the programs. Rather, the cable operators need a license.
Thus, in a free market, syndicators should not expect to receive cable royalties
absent the right to license cable operators.
Under a compulsory license system, however, the right to cable royalties
is, in effect, a substitute for the right to license cable operators. See supra
notes 128-30 and accompanying text. Therefore, if Congress replaces the current system with a free market system, syndicators who currently own the
right to cable royalties should receive the right to license cable operators. If
not, the syndicators' expectations will be undermined and they will be
harmed.
161. The Ninth Circuit recognized that a contract provision precluding the
syndicator from licensing cable operators is, in most situations, not determinative. 875 F.2d at 1451 (stating that "[d]espite this restriction it would have
been quite possible for the parties to agree that Worldvision would receive all
or part of the royalties flowing from cable rebroadcast of transmissions by
over-the-air television").
162. See id. In Barris,the compensation clause provided that:
Worldvision is to receive as "full and complete compensation," thirty
percent of gross receipts, defined as "all license fees actually received
by us under License Agreements .... ." "Under License Agreements"
clearly refers to amounts received from over-the-air television stations with whom Worldvision negotiated agreements and not to
amounts received as statutory cable royalties.
Id.
163. See id. at 1449.
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tive of cable royalty entitlement. If syndicators believe they
are legally entitled to cable royalties, they will bid up the price
of program distribution rights to reflect this additional source
of revenue regardless of the compensation provision.16 Because confusion still exists as to how cable royalty ownership is
determined, 6 5 it is possible that contracts exist in which the
syndicator expected to receive and thus paid for cable royalties.
To determine whether a syndicator paid for the right to cable
royalties, courts can compare the price the syndicator paid for
the distribution right of the disputed program with the price
paid for the distribution right of similar programs that either
expressly included or excluded the right to cable royalties.
After looking for contractual clues to cable royalty entitlement, courts should examine the parties' conduct with regard
to cable royalties. If one of the parties received all the royalties
or if the royalties were shared prior to the litigation, this conduct serves as strong evidence of what the parties considered
fair. Moreover, the prior distributions indicate what the parties
would have contracted for if they had considered the issue of
cable royalty ownership. 6 6
If the court concludes that, at the time of contracting, the
parties intended that the producer receive the royalties, the
court then must determine whether the syndicator discounted
the price paid for the distribution right to reflect the risk of future regulatory changes unfavorable to broadcasters. 67 Unless
the syndicator paid the producer to assume this risk, the syn164. In a competitive market, the price paid for a product will reflect its
true value. The right to receive cable royalties adds value to the distribution
right. Thus, because syndicators will pay for cable royalties if they expect to
receive them, whether the producer intended to transfer the royalties is irrelevant. To allow this fact to preclude the syndicator from royalty entitlement
would be inequitable. The producer would be compensated for cable retrans-

mission twice and the syndicator would have paid for them twice.
165. In bath Barris and NBC, the syndicator argued that Congress intended
syndicators to receive the cable royalties. Barns Indus. v. Worldvision Enters.,
875 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1989); NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848

F.2d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also 1984 Distribution, supra note 4, at 8411
(noting the arguments the syndicator made to the CRT).
166. The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize this fact in Barris. The court refused to consider evidence that the parties had been splitting the cable royalties because they found the contract not reasonably susceptible to this
interpretation. Barris, 875 F.2d at 1450. The court also found no indication

that the parties considered the issue of cable royalties at the time of contracting. Id. It seems unlikely that the compensation provision could be dispositive of cable royalty entitlement given the parties failure to consider this

issue when drafting the contract and the parties subsequent conduct.
167. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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dicator is entitled to increases in cable royalties to offset any
corresponding decreases in licensing revenues. The syndicator
must foresee the threat of regulatory change before it will discount the price.16s Courts thus should look for evidence that
the parties anticipated this risk.169 If there was no discount the
syndicator is entitled to the increase in cable royalties even
though the producer is entitled to the level of cable royalties
existing before the regulatory change. Although the courts and
the CRT may have difficultly administering this rule, it is the
only distribution that will compensate the parties in relation to
their harm.
If the court is unable to determine cable royalty entitlement, it should split the royalties between the producer and
syndicator in the same manner in which the parties divide
broadcast licensing revenues. This resolution eliminates the
possibility that the syndicator would receive only increases in
cable royalties resulting from regulatory change while the pro1 0
ducer would receive the remainderY
' Furthermore, by alleviating the risk of regulatory change, 171 this approach promotes
economic benefits. 172 Moreover, because of these economic
168. Cf. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 113, at 85 (stating that for the insurer to know how much to ask from the other party to the contract for bearing the risk in question, the probability and magnitude of the risk must be

known).
169. Evidence may include contract price and reference to regulatory
change in contract negotiations.
170. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38. One goal of courts is to encourage efficient risk-bearing. See Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine,11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 314 (1982). Additional goals include:
1) minimizing the legal costs of resolving disputes; 2) minimizing the costs to
the parties of bargaining the terms of contracts; and 3) providing simple rules
that apply to a broad variety of situations. Id. A rule splitting cable royalties
between the producer and the syndicator when the contract does not provide
for an alternative distribution furthers these goals by providing certainty and
flexibility in negotiation.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 137-45. Maintaining the CRT's
syndicator distribution rule also will help promote the economic benefits resulting from risk reduction. Because the syndicator receives the cable royalties, producers are likely to transfer the right to cable royalties to the
syndicator rather than trusting the syndicator to pass on the royalties. Thus, a
syndicator distribution default rule honors current contractual relationships
while providing the parties with a strong incentive to place the right to cable
royalties in the syndicator. Furthermore, it gives parties the flexibility to contract around the rule.
In Bar is, the Ninth Circuit stated that it did not "reach the issue of
whether it is appropriate for the CRT to distribute royalties to [the producer]
in the first instance." 875 F.2d 1446, 1449 n.1. Based on the benefits of the syndicator distribution rule discussed above, the Ninth Circuit erred by drawing
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benefits, a rule that gives syndicators a portion of cable royalties equal to the percentage of broadcast licensing revenues received likely reflects the contractual relationship that would
exist if the parties had contemplated the distribution of cable
royalties.
B.

A FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING CONTRACTS

Producers and syndicators can avoid contractual disputes
regarding cable royalty entitlement by expressly and unambiguously providing for this right in their syndication contracts.
Often this type of drafting is easier said than done. The key is
to address every issue that may arise. This Note provides a list
of issues regarding cable royalties that producers and syndicators should address when drafting syndication agreements. 73
Syndication Agreement Checklist
Which party is entitled to the statutory cable royalties?
If divided between the producer and syndicator.
a. What should be the percentage split?
b. How should the costs related to the CRT proceedings be factored in?
c. Which party should represent the program before the CRT?
3. If the compulsory license system is abolished and a free market
system established:
a. Which party should have the right to license cable operators?
b. Will the cable licensing revenue be divided on the same basis
as the statutory cable royalties were?
c. How should the costs related to cable licensing be factored in?
1.
2.

If the answers to the above questions are clearly provided
for in syndication agreements, producers and syndicators can
avoid disputes over cable royalty entitlement. Furthermore, by
answering the above questions in the following recommended
manner, producers and syndicators can achieve economic efficiency in the distribution process.
Because the risk of regulatory change is diversified away
when the syndicator receives both broadcast licensing revenue
and cable royalties, 174 syndicators should be entitled to a perinto question the rule's validity and efficiency. Although this rule may not always be consistent with contractual ownership of cable royalties, it is consistent with the contractual relationship most likely found in the marketplace.
Thus, courts should not discard the rule.

173. In addition to the listed issues, drafters of all syndication agreements
must face issues concerning the basis for dividing revenue, the duration of the
syndicator's distribution rights, the geographical limits of the distribution
right, and the amount of advance financing by the syndicator. NETwoRK IN-

QUIRY, supra note 10, at 120.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
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centage of the royalties at least equal to the percentage of
broadcast licensing revenues they receive. Also, because syndicators usually are more aware of cable retransmission of the
programs they distribute,175 making syndicators responsible for
representing programs before the CRT is logical. This alloca1 76
tion is consistent with the CRT's syndicator distribution rule.
Furthermore, the expertise of syndicators in licensing broadcasters makes them the appropriate party to license cable operators in a free market system. 177 This is especially true because
a syndicator's distribution of programs to broadcasters is, in effect, a distribution to cable operators. 7 The parties should
split the resulting revenues on the same basis they split the
statutory cable royalties. Because the cost of licensing cable operators will surely increase in a free market system, 179 the parties must consider this additional cost. A recommended
solution is to subtract licensing costs off the top before the producer and syndicator split the licensing revenues. If the above
recommendations are followed, producers and syndicators will
establish an efficient distribution system that benefits not only
themselves, but also the viewing public.8 0
CONCLUSION
By adopting a compulsory license system for cable retransmission of copyrighted programs and recognizing the divisibility
of a copyright, the 1976 Copyright Act opened the door for disputes between producers and syndicators over the ownership of
cable royalties. In NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal,the first
producer-syndicator dispute, the D.C. Circuit held that the syndication contract determines ownership of cable royalties. The
court, however, did not provide the basis for its holding and
failed to demonstrate how the right to cable royalties fit within
the enumerated exclusive rights of section 106. In Barris Industries v. Worldvision Enterprises, the second producer-syn175. By licensing broadcasters, syndicators learn which programs cable operators have retransmitted into which markets.

176. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
177. Not only do syndicators have the licensing mechanism in place, but

they also know which programs broadcasters are going to transmit and thus
are available for cable retransmission.

178. See supra note 133.
179. Congress, in fact, established a compulsory license system because it

feared that the negotiations required by a free market system would be unduly
burdensome. See HousE REPORT, supra note 38, at 89.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 136-46.
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dicator dispute, the Ninth Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit's
holding and found that the syndication contract precluded the
syndicator from receiving any cable royalties.
This Note argues that the D.C. Circuit correctly held that
the syndication contract determines the cable royalty owner.
Unlike the court's holding, however, this Note analyzes why
this is the correct interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act.
The Note demonstrates that the right to cable royalties is an
economic benefit attaching to a subdivision of the performance
and distribution right. Thus, section 201(d) allows the producer
to transfer the right to cable royalties. Finally, this Note provides a framework for analyzing and drafting contracts to ensure that the appropriate party receives the cable royalties.
JacquelineA. Layton

